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ABSTRACT 
This is a paper about expectations surrounding a potentially highly transformative moment in 
East Africa’s history: the arrival of underwater fibre-optic broadband communications cables 
into the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa. It combines a media content analysis with findings 
from interviews with business owners in Kenya’s nascent business process outsourcing 
(BPO) and software development sectors in order to explore how such moments of 
technological ‘connectivity’ are imagined, marketed and enacted within economic 
development. It argues that connectivity is not just a matter of boosting physical/material 
capacity but also about redressing conceptual connectivity; bringing places ‘closer together’ 
involves rehabilitating the images of places in peoples’ minds and removing imagined senses 
of distance. As such, technologies of connectivity are marketed not just as tools of altered 
communications affordances, but more importantly, as momentary opportunities for revisiting 
the image of places from afar. Additionally, the cables reveal the importance of fostering 
internal linkages in order to better build international recognition and connections. ‘Moments 
of expectation’ that surround new ICT technologies reveal how discourse and representation 
play a strong role in enabling markets to form and change. The very idea of ‘connectivity’ 
itself is driving plans and policies throughout the region. 
“The great historical tragedy of Africa has been not so much that it was too late in 
making contact with the rest of the world, as the manner in which that contact was 
brought about” 
Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 1950 (1997): 226. 
1.  INTRODUCTION: AN IMPORTANT ARRIVAL 
Contemporary digital communications are primarily made possible through fibre optic cables 
that span the globe and connect almost all populated places with one another. They are the 
conduit for the vast majority of international internet communication, voice calls and data 
                                                           
1 This work was supported by grants from the British Academy, the John Fell Fund, and the 
ESRC/DFID. We also wish to thank Isis Hjorth, Dorothea Kleine, Jim Murphy, Casper 
Andersen, Olga Morawczynski and Padraig Carmody for their helpful input, feedback and 
suggestions. 
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transmission. Yet, until the summer of 2009, there was only one major region of the planet 
that remained disconnected from this global network: East Africa2. 
Until this time, East Africa had recorded extremely low rates of ICT access and use 
(Etta and Parvyn-wamahiu, 2003; Thioune, 2003). Furthermore the region had some of the 
highest data costs in the world due to the heavy reliance on satellite connections, which were 
both much slower and more expensive than connections elsewhere in the world. This all 
changed in July of 2009, when the first of four cables landed in Mombassa, Kenya and Dar es 
Salam, Tanzania (see Figure 1). The four cables, which cost over one billion US dollars to 
construct, were financed through a combination of private investment and public-private 
partnerships and are part of a scheme to develop ICT-related industries like Business 
Processes Outsourcing (BPO3) and software development in the region. 
SeaCom, the company that backed the cables, promoted their arrival as bringing a 
future in which “Africa [is] connected to the world”. Such a claim, of course, implies that 
Africa was previously disconnected. As scholars of African history have all too well 
established, Africa has been ‘connected’ to the rest of the world for a very long time, albeit 
within an international framework of unequal economic and political power and within a 
philosophical framework in which the image and positionality of Africa and Africans has 
been reflected through a prism of ‘Otherness’ and difference from the West (Mudimbe, 1988; 
Bayart, 2000; Lovejoy, 2011). Moreover, connectivity with the outside world has been 
channeled through state elites who have tended to monopolize opportunities within the 
economy through their control of the state and its resources (Cooper, 1997; 2002; See also 
Allen, 1995)The pressing question is not whether or not Africa is connected to the rest of the 
world, but how and under what circumstances that connectivity is achieved and sustained. 
More broadly, does high-speed internet represent a ‘novel’ form of connectivity that can 
challenge entrenched patterns of elite extraversion and international dependence (Bayart, 
2000; Cooper, 1997) or do ICT optimists in Africa suffer from historical amnesia on issues of 
connectivity? 
As evidenced by the movements of Pan-Africanism in the 1960s and by more recent, 
market-orientated attempts to encourage an ‘African renaissance’ and a New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD), leaders on the continent have long recognized that there are 
not just structural, geographical or technological barriers that separate them from global 
circulations of wealth and power, but also conceptual and representational barriers that limit 
their ability to influence their positions within the international system (Ajulu, 2001). This 
article explores attempts to re-define such conceptual connectivity at a more micro level: 
within the ICT and business process outsourcing (BPO) sector of Kenya. We focus on these 
particular sectors of the economy because of both their relevance to the perceived radical 
transformation in Kenya’s communications infrastructure and their departure from traditional 
economic priorities in the country. 
                                                           
2 Until 2009, East Africa was forced to rely on satellites for all international connectivity: 
making Internet access slower and more expensive than in the rest of the world. 
3 For the remainder of this paper, we use “BPO” to refer to information processing and 
software development work that is performed as service for other companies. In other words, 
the term is employed to refer to a range of work from digital sweatshops doing highlight 
repetitive tasks to innovative and creative software development. 
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Figure 1: Africa’s Undersea Cables in 2009 and 2012 
   
 
The paper draws on material from four sources: (1) interviews conducted in 2010 with 
twenty managers of BPO and software firms based in Nairobi; (2) a qualitative content 
analysis of 378 international and East African media reports of the landing of the cables; and 
(3) an analysis of Kenya’s national development plan (Vision 2030) and surrounding 
documents and speeches. This varied material will demonstrate how the expectations 
surrounding the cables have played a strong role in allowing a new industry to form and 
grow. While the role of optimism is entrenched in the way we think about financial markets 
(Galbraith, 1954; de Meza and Southey, 1996; Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) ), it has largely been 
neglected in discussions of development in Africa. To many in Kenya today, the cables and 
the broader ‘ICT revolution’ thought to be happening on the continent represent an 
opportunity to use internet mediated representations to enact change in the imaginations of 
others. 
2.  RE-IMAGINING GEOGRAPHIES OF REPRESENTATION 
While previous technological revolutions (like the Green Revolution) were enabled by a 
material chemistry, it is partly a conceptual chemistry that underpins enactions and 
understandings of the contemporary ‘ICT Revolution’. On the one hand, much online life 
involves self-representation- the careful construction of ourselves and our businesses through 
articulated images and words- but on the other hand, the internet is also a repository of 
information about ourselves that others have disclosed, produced and occasionally, falsified. 
It is a chemistry that we cannot completely control for it combines public and private in new 
ways (Sveningsson, 2008). 
When dealing with unfamiliar firms online, we often look for clues about the validity 
and authenticity of their claims: Who is this company? How can I trust them? We might 
search for evidence of an offline presence, a building or other traces that connects it to 
institutions or people that we recognize. We search for common associations, testimonies 
from others, evidence that demonstrates that this company with whom we deal is not merely a 
phantom of self-representation, but a real entity located in a ‘real world’. At the same time, 
we may use the internet in reverse, as a tool to validate offline claims (Orgad, 2008). Our 
online and offline presences are interwoven in a chemistry of representation. 
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In other words, we cannot discard the disadvantages we face in our offline lives just 
because we “go online”. They remain. Nor do we interpret others with clean slates. Former 
associations and prejudices cloud our appraisals of online others. We should not think of 
internet connectivity as a binary of a disembedded online and an embedded offline life, but 
something that infuses life and seeps between online and offline spaces (Markham, 1998; 
Wellman and Haythornwaite, 2002). 
Economies are not just sites and networks of information transmission but also 
imagined and cognitive spaces where people form beliefs about the authority and value of 
information. ICTs not only change the pace and flow of information transmission, they also 
shape the way in which information is produced and evaluated. Moreover, representations 
and associations also impact the way in which actors interpret and trust different streams of 
information. Some scholars have referred to these intermediating influences as ‘socio-
cognitive prostheses’ in that they allow individuals to understand and interpret the 
information they receive through use of extra cognitive ‘limbs’ (Caliskan and Callon, 2009 
and 2010). In other words, our cognition is distributed between our own minds and the 
environments in which we think and operate (Callon and Law, 1995; Callon, Millo and 
Muniesa, 2007). 
Africa has not had an easy time in Western imaginations. Images of the continent have 
been marred by narratives of conflict and poverty blasted from news reports, NGO 
advertisements, grim economic reports and occasionally, tragic Hollywood films (Achebe, 
1977; Mudimbe, 1988; Fair, 1993; Wainaina, 2005). Many consider the continent a 
‘dangerous place’, one deserving of pity or charity, but not one that readily excites 
anticipations of growth and profit among investors. As the economist, Elizabeth Asiedu 
writes: 
“Countries in SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) have on average received less FDI 
than countries in other regions by virtue of their geographical location- 
there is a negative effect on FDI for being an African country. The negative 
and significant estimated coefficient of the Africa dummy suggests that 
there may be adverse regional effect for SSA. There are two plausible 
explanations for this. First, the continent is perceived as being inherently 
risky. This perception of Africa is supported by the empirical evidence of 
Haque, Nelson and Mathieson (2000), who find that commercial risk-rating 
agencies often rate African countries as riskier than warranted by the 
fundamentals. Second, due to lack of knowledge about countries in the 
continent, investment decisions are often not guided by country-specific 
conditions but rather based on inferences from the environment of 
neighbouring countries. Thus, to some extent, foreign investors evaluate 
African countries as if the countries in the continent constitute “one big 
country” (Asiedu, 2002: 114).  
Accordingly, African entrepreneurs and creators face an uphill battle to redress this 
representation and garner better linkages, investment and trade for themselves (Bonsu, 2009; 
Nworah, 2006). 
In recent years, African leaders and businesspeople have attempted to employ 
marketing and place-branding expertise, often through online portals, to better control and 
commodify the identities and images of their nations abroad. Existing research on such 
strategies has tended to focus on government websites and on government-led place-branding 
EJISDC (2013) 56, 2, 1-19 
The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries 
www.ejisdc.org 
5
strategies. For example, Nworah explores the Nigerian government’s Heart of Africa Image 
Project to redress the negative image of Nigerians online in light of 419 e-mail scams 
(Nworah, 2006). Fürsich and Robins have similarly conducted a content analysis of 29 
African government websites to “explore how dominant structures within particular nations 
assert their role in the global imagined community” (Fürsich and Robins, 2002). They 
describe how the discourse “oscillates between motifs of modernity coded as capitalist 
progress (links to investment opportunities, tourism and national achievements) and as 
tradition (links to historic descriptions and tribal differentiation, with images of the pre-
modern life, and nature and wildlife as signifiers)” (Fürsich and Robins, 2002: 196). The use 
of primordial identity as a “commercialized identity to be sold to global interests” (Fürsich 
and Robins, 2002: 206) is strongly echoed in John and Jean Comaroff’s study of 
commercialised identities in ethno-businesses in South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff, 
2009). Such online representations are not dissimilar from the representations depicted in 
older analogue forms of media like stamps, currencies and newspaper advertisements. 
While such studies of online branding demonstrate that the growth of the internet by 
no means diminishes negative (or simplified) stereotypes of Africa abroad nor necessarily 
undermines the dominance of national and tribal gatekeepers in the integration of economic 
identities and positionalities into the global system, the focus on top-down strategies, hides 
those of other businesses and entrepreneurs who might suffer from association with these 
‘primordial’ identities and may use the internet for alternative representations. It is not just 
governments that are engaged in place-branding and representations, but individual actors as 
well. In contrast to the perception held of 419 scammers or the naturalized tribes on tourism 
or government sites, it would appear that, at least for however long the delicate balance of 
optimism lasts, many Kenyan ICT firms are seizing hold of the opportunity to re-invent a 
more positive conceptual connectivity for themselves and thereby re-define their positions 
within a global geography of representation. 
3.  AN EVOLVING VISION OF CONNECTIVITY 
At first glance, Kenya might seem an unlikely destination for a thriving ICT sector: it is in the 
bottom quintile of the UN’s Human Development Index and is beset by serious economic, 
social and political problems and struggles with a crumbling infrastructure. According to the 
World Bank (2011), the number of power outages in Kenya in a typical month is 6.9 and over 
a quarter of Kenyan firms identify the availability of electricity as a major constraint facing 
their businesses. 
The BPO sector in Kenya employs only about 4,000 people and accounts for less than 
0.01% of GDP (Republic of Kenya, 2007a; Omondi, 2012).4 This figure compares poorly 
with India’s corresponding figure of 5.2% (Waema, 2009). Despite this low number, Vision 
2030, the Kenyan government’s national development plan5, argues that the country should 
reduce its dependence on traditional agricultural commodities and focus more intently on the 
export of services (Kenyan ICT Board, 2009). The sector has therefore been set out as one of 
the six pillars of economic growth. 
                                                           
4 No current official statistics are available on the number of people employed in the Kenyan 
BPO sector. In 2007, the government put the figure at 3,500. More recent estimates by 
journalists and analysts suggest the number has reached 4,000. 
5 Vision 2030 is currently being implemented through a series of five year development plans 
that a semi autonomous government agency oversees in collaboration with all relevant 
government departments and ministries. 
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Plans specifically call for up to 20,000 BPO jobs and sales of about 120 million US 
dollars per annum by 2012 (Republic of Kenya, 2007a; Omondi, 2012). Such growth would 
make BPO the country’s fourth biggest export after horticulture, tea and tourism and would 
promote the sector, in the words of Vision 2030 as the “sector of choice employment among 
youth and young professionals” (Republic of Kenya, 2007a: 81). 
For the planners behind Vision 2030, the arrival of fibre-optic cables represented the 
spark that would ignite this economic transformation. These expectations were further 
amplified and reproduced by media reporting on the arrival of the cables in the year after 
their landing. In both Kenyan and international stories and reports, there was a palpable sense 
of optimism and a taken-for-grantedness about the economic boost that faster internet 
connections would bring about, often stated in bold and powerful terms. 
For instance, thirty two articles in our content analysis used the world “revolution” to 
frame the landing of the cables (e.g. the Sunday Independent’s, June 14, 2010 reports “Fasten 
your seatbelts for the internet speed revolution”), whilst only fifteen of the news reports 
raised any sort of critical reflection about this link between connectivity and economic 
growth (e.g. constraints due to relatively low literacy rates, unreliable electricity supply, 
shortage of skills and local content, and rigid regulatory regimes). The BPO sector, in 
particular was singled out as the prime source of economic growth, with more than 10% (37) 
of the articles specifically identifying BPO as the most obvious area for growth. 
This optimism was also reflected in 2010 interviews with business managers. While 
many managers recognized that the cables would not allow them to overcome all the issues 
they faced (access, pricing, speed, vandalism, electricity, etc.), they drew on similar narratives 
of how connectivity offered, not just incremental, but transformative, change. For instance, 
the manager of Iavi, David Mark, described how: 
the reality is a lot [was] possible but now you have people motivated and less 
frustrated when they use the internet because of the speed… it’s not a binary thing 
where those things weren’t possible before the cable- but yeah, it’s an idea that 
‘Oh yeah, you know, in Kenya, we’ve solved that internet problem. 
Joseph Koch of Samnet, a Web services company, echoed this idea: 
There has been so much buzz about the cables that everybody understands… they 
were going to change the country and you know there was a lot of buzz. And it 
gets people to go out and try and explore internet connectivity… And then it 
opens the possibilities- it opens people’s minds into, you know, as to what is 
possible. 
Such expectations were also frequently expressed within the contexts of upgrading and 
reconfigured value chains. Mugendi Nguru, the director of KenyaTweets.com, talking about 
his experiences before the cables, recalled: “without faster internet, you’re landlocked. You 
can only do small projects.” Guy Curtis of Brand Africa similarly explained: 
I can get a client in Britain as much as a bigger company can get a client in 
Britain. So I find the barriers … are no longer there, because internet has made 
that the world to get global village [sic]. 
It might appear that these journalists and managers had simply been swept away by the 
unrealistic expectations marketed by the internet providers themselves during the time of 
radically changing connectivities in Kenya. A more pessimistic reading of connectivity might 
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acknowledge that broadband connectivity involves accelerating interdependence with 
domestic and foreign technology providers (Cline-cole and Powell 2004; Ya’u 2004). Even 
for those ‘sector of choice’ workers employed in BPO work, the long-term picture is far from 
ideal; the comparative advantage of much BPO work lies in flexible, low cost labour 
performing repetitive, outsourced tasks like basic customer care and data entry. In other 
words, upgrading East Africa’s connection to the world is not a one-off technological 
acquisition, but rather a commitment to continually renew and deepen that connection (and 
potential vulnerability) in the future. 
While much research has repeatedly demonstrated that the internet cannot eliminate the 
frictions of distance, bring into being a “global village” or serve as a panacea for 
development (e.g. Graham, 2008; 2011; 2013), this paper will demonstrate that the idealism 
surrounding the cables nevertheless produced distinct consequences. Exaggerated 
assumptions about the potentials of the internet are not only continuously repeated, but work 
as a powerful driving force shaping a range of business plans and strategies. As such, 
connectivity should not be understood chiefly as physical link that can be mediated through 
technological intervention. Rather technologies of connectivity, like the cables, are 
represented not just as tools of altered communications affordances, but more importantly, as 
momentary opportunities for redefining the image of places from afar. The next section will 
describe two clusters of expectations that have formed as a result of the arrival of the cables. 
It will contrast these two strategies and will reveal the mutually enhancing relationship 
between international and domestic forms of connectivity. 
4.  CLUSTERS OF EXPECTATION 
Research has emphasized the role of inter-firm networks and clusters as resources through 
which African producers can build better international comparative advantages and thereby 
carve out stronger positionalities on the world stage (Mccormick, 1999; Murphy, 2007). Such 
clusters have been shown to facilitate trust, encourage innovation and knowledge transfer, 
concentrate lobbying attention on policy-makers and garner better market access to goods and 
services in international markets. However, as Murphy writes: 
[i]n African cities… industrial clusters remain poorly developed and unsupported 
by most states. Where clusters have emerged, they have benefited primarily local 
markets, been organized by informal sector firms, exploited only pecuniary and 
labor pooling advantages, and have not exhibited what Bell and Albu (1999) term 
the “knowledge-changing” capabilities needed to facilitate a shift to higher-value 
and/or more globally desirable products (Murphy, 2007: 1758). 
This section shows how the expectations surrounding the cables have generated two 
kinds of clustering strategies that may overcome these limitations. It will critically analyze 
these two strategies taking into account of both the potential of alliances to influence Kenya’s 
international position in an international division of labour and the potential of clusters to 
harness the synergetic properties of networks to stimulate innovation and knowledge sharing. 
Vision 2030 specifically calls for attracting a cluster of large international companies. 
Released in 2007, it states that: “This will be done by attracting at least 5 major leading IT 
suppliers, at least 10 large multinational companies and global BPO players to Kenya” 
(Republic of Kenya, 2007b: 14). At the time of research, the Kenyan government hoped to 
attract these companies to Kenya through the construction of a clustering ‘technocity’ in 
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Malili6, in an area that is sixty kilometers outside of the capital Nairobi but only eleven 
minutes from its international airport on a planned train link (Mark, 2011). Through public-
private partnerships, the Kenyan government invested 17 million USD in the project (Muli, 
2010). As Samuel Poghisio, the Minister of Information and Communication puts it: 
The technopolois development leverages Kenya’s unique status as a cultural, 
political, economic and transportation hub for Eastern Africa to lead the region in 
joining the Global Information Economy (quoted in China Daily, 2010). 
From the point of view of Vision 2030, a niche had initially been targeted: customer-
care and voice services performed at a large scale and for a low cost (e.g. for airlines or 
banks) (Kenya ICT Board 2010).7  There was thus more of a concern that poverty was 
exacerbated by lack of access to markets (Marker et. al. 2002) than an attempt to upgrade into 
more advantageous value chain positions. Disconnection was understood principally as 
matter of geographical and technological isolation, and the government sought to bridge this 
gap through the development of a formal ‘international hub’. 
Interestingly, this approach contrasts sharply with the strategies of smaller Nairobi-
based companies engaging in social media work, software development, web design, mobile 
application development, IT consulting, Web mapping, and various other information 
processing, design and development tasks. Many of these firms use one of Nairobi’s five 
innovation clusters (‘iHub,’ ‘Nailab,’ ‘Fablab,’ ‘iLab’ and the Human IPO’s Start-up Garage) 
as focal points. The largest of these incubators is the cluster focused around the iHub.  
The iHub was set up in 2010 and quickly turned into an important part of Nairobi’s 
BPO and software sectors. The building consists of a large open space with desk spaces, free 
high-speed internet access and a range of meeting and social spaces (see figure 2). The 
centre’s physical space is supplemented with a variety of online spaces and networks (i.e. a 
blog, email list, Twitter feed, and Facebook group) that attempt to foster a sense of 
community around regular events (e.g. hackathons8, invited talks and parties) held both in the 
iHub and elsewhere in Nairobi. While clusters and face-to-face interaction are important 
elements in any regional development plan (Bathelt et al, 2004; Florida, 2002; Martin and 
Sunley, 2003; Storper and Venebles, 2004), a sharp contrast is apparent between the 
government’s technocity far from the hustle and bustle of Nairobi’s traffic but connected to 
its international airport and the i-Hub, set within the everyday environment of the city. These 
two very different forms of connectivities are also embodied in their different value chain 
strategies. While the proposed technocity was originally intended to focus on low-end 
outsourcing work like data entry and call-centres (essentially turning Malili into a digital 
export processing zone), the i-hub was built precisely to foster activities that would allow for 
both domestic generativity and, in many cases, upgraded value chain positions. 
The growth of informal networks, fostered knowledge sharing and business 
collaboration at the i-hub, has been impressive. As of March 2011, the centre had over 3,000 
members. Over 1000 of those members are software developers, and about 900 are designers. 
                                                           
6 The plans for the technocity display a gleaming golden city of skyscrapers surrounded by 
parks and lakes.  
7 This targetting is also being performed through tax breaks (Waema 2005) and the 
adjustment of curricula in all Kenyan universities to “deliver basic BPO skills” (Kenya ICT 
Board 2010). 
8A hackathon is a short and intense period of collaboration on code or software. 
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Importantly, at least twelve companies have already been formed through connections made 
in the iHub and three companies have found funding through investors that have used the 
iHub as a place to specifically find startup firms.9 
The example of iHub makes it hard to deny that there is a strong culture of innovation 
in Kenya’s ICT industry. From our sample of interviews, it appears that most of the firms that 
cluster around Nairobi’s innovation hubs are recent and only consist of a few employees (in 
other words, they are stereotypical high tech startup companies). Many of the firms 
interviewed in 2010 were founded specifically to take advantage of the arrival of the new 
fibre-optic cables, knowing that the possibilities for work would greatly expand in a post-
cable landing environment and every respondent interviewed (irrespective of whether the 
arrival of the fibre-optic cables had any influence on why they decided to begin operations) 
indicated that faster internet connections have now become essential to the ways in which 
they conduct their business, in terms of information gathering, communications and sales. 
Figure 2: The Nairobi iHub 
 
These companies and entrepreneurs had, until recently, been left outside of the official 
plans of the Kenyan government. As mentioned, Vision 2030 focused on low-end outsourcing 
work (like data entry and call-centres), and attempted to ‘just be there’ in the BPO industry. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, the government seems to have adapted its focus in order to 
accommodate this alternative vision of connectivity. 
At the Connected Kenya 2012 Summit, the government announced a new National 
ICT master plan that would seek to place Kenya among the top 10 ICT hubs in the world 
(Wafula, 2012). According to the Kenyan Information and Communication Permanent 
Secretary, Bitange Ndemo: 
                                                           
9 According to Erik Hersman (2011), there are a total of 3,036 members in the iHub 
community. 
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We are looking at having about 500 medium sized companies, the size of 
Sevenseas Technologies, and 20 multinational companies. We already are 
on the way of having the first multinational company in Ushahidi, as soon 
as it can get a way to monetise its services (quoted in Wafula, 2012). 
The new plans hope to expand ICT’s contribution to the country’s GDP to about 25 
per cent (Wafula, 2012). The Kenyan ICT Board has also introduced the Tandaa Digital 
Grant, setting aside eighty eight million USD in World Bank grants to stimulate local 
software developers. In its second year, in 2012, the fund awarded 30 grants to techpreneurs. 
Signalling the change of approach, Ndemo commented: 
We have moved from discussing infrastructure to policy, content and 
capacity building in the industry. We need applications that can be able to 
offer Kenyans solutions and help us create internal efficiencies. By so 
doing we will save the economy billions of shillings (quoted in KICT, 
2012). 
Both public and private sector actors are investing huge amounts of money in plans 
framed by a powerful discourse that faster internet connectivity will bring about powerful 
economic changes. Furthermore, these expectations are encouraging the focusing of energies 
in two different clusters, one led by the government and one led by the private sector, but 
both buoyant on optimism. As a result of the growth of centres like i-hub and the success of 
many local developers, the government itself seems to have amended its understanding of 
connectivity from one concerned with a lack of access to markets to one concerned with a 
more conceptual understanding that challenges both internal forms of connectivity and 
Kenya’s place in a global division of labour. At the same time, the development of centres 
like the i-hub signal alternative forms of international connectivity that challenge the 
prominence of states in mediating opportunity within the Kenyan economy. The final section 
will present two detailed case studies of the Kenyan firms, Horizon and Verviant, which have 
attempted to use the conceptual connectivity generated by the cables to fundamentally 
challenge the representation of their businesses and the wider Kenyan economy. 
5.  CASE STUDIES: HORIZON AND VERVIANT 
Horizon is a company that was founded specifically to take advantage of the arrival of the 
fibre-optic cables. The company sits close to Nairobi’s international airport overlooking a 
national park (see figure 3) 10. The company does a variety of back office and contact centre 
work, with a particular focus on transcriptions and call centre operations for UK-based 
companies. 
As of late 2010, they employed 180 employees doing around-the-clock work, but their 
facility allows them to quickly scale up to 1500 call centre seats in the event of a larger 
contract. In many ways, therefore, Horizon, is a perfect case for the type of firm that the 
government hopes to encourage as part of its Vision 2030 plans. 
Horizon’s CEO, Sanjay Sikka stressed that infrastructure could no longer be 
considered a major constraint since the arrival of the fibre-optic cables. The company is 
currently sited in a secure business park and would be a candidate for the move into the 
Malili technocity. They have two redundant power generators, and physically and logically 
redundant fibre links to ensure almost always-on connectivity. 
                                                           
10 The CEO of the company speculated that Horizon was probably the only contact centre in 
the world from which employees could see giraffes and elephants out of their windows. 
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Figure 3: Horizon Contact Centre Main office on Mombasa Rd., Nairobi 
   
Mr. Sikka felt that the most significant constraint faced by the Kenyan BPO industry 
was not poor infrastructure but rather the widespread belief (from both within and outside of 
the country) that developing a viable technology sector in the country was unrealistic. For 
instance, when asked what some of the key barriers to the growth of Horizon are, Mr. Sikka, 
claimed that: 
The biggest barrier is the fact that, like I said, Kenya is not perceived as a future 
BPO destination... there is a lot of negativity around political stability, safety, 
crime rate, and I think those are detrimental. 
it has a lot to do with the image…when we were building our website, one of the 
things I wanted to put was a virtual tour of the facility where I wanted people 
to—when I say, “This is who we are,” people go to the website, they click on our 
building… people may have a vague—somebody who has not been here will 
have a very different image… I don’t know what it is like over there. 
But he believed that the arrival of the cables had done much to change those 
perceptions: 
The fiber optic has made it a connected world… it’s far easier to sell outsourcing 
to an overseas client. It’s important to have confidence when you are talking to 
overseas customers, and thereby that feeling of connectivity, you are a connected 
world, you are no longer isolated, one country within Africa, the Dark Continent, 
so on and so forth. It’s important to overcome that feeling. 
Similarly, when speaking more directly about his own firm, he observed: 
When you have an organization in, say, UK or US, when they’re thinking of 
outsourcing to us, and suddenly they say, “You don’t even have fibre in this 
country.” You will never be hired. You’re not in the same place as the others. So I 
think [the fibre-optic cables] puts you in that same league. 
There remained concerns that “a lot that needs to be done for [the BPO sector] in terms 
of putting it on the global map,” but overall Mr. Sikka believed that a more level playing field 
had now been established, and that Kenyan firms like his could use their perceived 
competitive advantages (price, similar time zone to markets, cultural similarities) to gain 
international outsourcing work. In other words, one of the most significant benefits of the 
EJISDC (2013) 56, 2, 1-19 
The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries 
www.ejisdc.org 
12
cables for Horizon was a conceptual: the fact that “confidence obviously comes in when you 
are connected, when you feel you’re a part of the global economy.” 
The second company, Verviant operates under a significantly different business model 
from Horizon. The company employs a relatively small number of staff (24 employees) and 
perform both on-demand Web development, software design, and mobile application 
development as well as creating their own software and IT platforms that they attempt to 
market to other companies (see figure 4). Verviant was founded in 2007 and began with a sole 
focus on outsourcing work. They initially struggled working with slow internet speeds, but 
ultimately were able to run their business through a 128k connection (this speed is only one 
half of the 2006 OECD definition of broadband).11 
Figure 4: Screenshot of Verviant’s website 
 
The CEO, Agosta Liko, explained that with such a slow connection “you couldn’t do 
YouTube, you couldn’t download music, you couldn’t do a lot of video stuff,” but that his 
company still got business because “we’ll be cheaper than a typical First World provider. 
[Clients] make it work because we give good work at a good price.” 
More recently, prices for faster internet speeds have dropped dramatically. The 
company currently has internet speeds that are twenty times faster than the bandwidth 
available four years ago (and was, furthermore, contemplating doubling those speeds in the 
near future). Mr. Liko explained that the increase in internet speeds has undoubtedly had an 
important effect on his business: 
now when I make my calls on Skype, so the business changes ... an upload that 
used to take two hours, it’s taking ten minutes. When we were remoting through a 
satellite and all that stuff, you used to type what is essential, you wait, but now 
you can work in real time. 
                                                           
11 OECD, 2006 
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The company sees its opportunity in doing work for what they call third-tier European 
and American companies. In other words, instead of targeting large multinationals that 
already have well-defined outsourcing strategies, they instead try to foster more intimate 
relationships with smaller companies (or IT consultants for those companies) that may have 
previously had only limited experience with outsourcing. Some of this work is done through 
existing contacts, but most is obtained though intermediate platforms like Guru.com and 
Elance.com. The company also performs a variety of software development that isn’t 
specifically commissioned by clients: a sign of innovation and generativity absent from many 
of Kenya’s contact centres. 
One example of Verviant’s work is the PesaPal project: a mobile payment platform that 
attempts to merge the highly popular M-Pesa mobile banking system with a web-based 
interface like PayPal. The tool therefore aims to disintermediate (by providing the consumer 
electronic payment infrastructure for) many financial transactions (a significant challenge in a 
country where most people do not have bank accounts) in Kenya in a way that should result 
in faster and more reliable movements of capital. 
Unsurprisingly, Mr. Liko explained that reliable and fast broadband connections had 
amplified their ability to do work for clients abroad: “I can work from Kenya and now they 
[customers abroad] will never feel that this guy is in Kenya. That’s pretty powerful.” 
Liko explained that they have traditionally faced a general unwillingness on the part of 
many potential customers to outsource work to Kenya, noting that: 
The first year of business was really tough. We told people, “I’m in Kenya,” they 
tell you, “Okay, cool, yeah, your product is good, and everything, but let me talk 
to other providers, then I’ll talk to you.” They’re worried. You think Kenya is 
Ethiopia. You think Kenya is Rwanda, you know, people think Africa is a big 
country. One big country, and that’s the perception. I lived in the States, and many 
people could not believe I speak English, they tell you—“You’ve learned English 
so fast” [laughter]  
It’s always going to be an obstacle. Look, when you tell someone, ‘I’m taking my 
software project to a company in Africa,’ there’s something wrong with that 
sentence. We’re not known for software. Yet…  
But the good thing about life right now, is that with that fiber optic cable, when 
Microsoft releases software, at midnight Pacific, I’m getting it before someone on 
the East Coast because they are asleep. Because midnight Pacific is 8am here. 
When Apple releases software, we’re getting it the same day, so [no more] “Oh, 
we’re bringing these people to teach the Africans,” I have the internet. I can learn. 
I can play with it. 
The traditional unwillingness of many clients to deal with African firms had meant that 
many of the intermediaries that Verviant transacted through ensured that the end customer 
never actually realises that their software or website was developed in Kenya. However, Liko 
hopes that the altered connectivity of the country will help foster a new sense of confidence, 
allowing the sector to start building stronger reputations: “So it’s a thing where you grow 
slowly. Now even Kenyans themselves are convinced that they’re known for software”. 
Verviant starkly illustrates that the possibilities within the Kenyan BPO sector for 
business practices significantly different from the contact-centre work performed by Horizon 
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and encouraged in government plans and strategies. Nevertheless, both CEOs maintain that 
one of the chief constraints traditionally facing their businesses was not the presence of 
physical distance or disconnection, but rather, a general reluctance on the part of foreign 
investors to do business with Kenya as an imagined place. 
But the cables, rather than being seen as a mere communication affordance, were being 
used to redress the conceptual connectivity of Kenya in the imaginations of such clients. The 
presence of a reliable and faster internet connection appears to be allowing Kenyan firms the 
opportunity to demonstrate a wider display of competence and capability. Thus the case of 
Kenyan BPO reveals something wider about the geography of connectivity. While we tend to 
think of the internet alternatively in terms of reducing distance and enabling connections 
between places and peoples or as a facilitator of a shared cyber-space (Malecki, 2002), both 
imaginations fail to fully capture the very powerful way that the internet has been employed 
in the Kenyan BPO and software industries. 
Fibre optic cables are neither solely material links between places nor facilitators of a 
transcendental geography. Rather their roll-out should be understood within a geography of 
representation in which people use both technical skills and representational skills to shape 
their online representations. Whether or not the internet will allow Kenyan and other African 
entrepreneurs to successfully change the perceptions that foreigners hold of their countries is 
uncertain, as both the 419 scammers of West Africa and the reproduced ‘Otherings’ of 
tourism and government websites demonstrate . The internet opens up new potentials for 
representation, but these opportunities are contested. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Firms have always had to adapt to technological changes in order to remain competitive and 
so this paper’s focus on Kenya’s ICT sector offers a unique opportunity to ask both how the 
cables are altering economic relationships, and how they are changing experienced and 
imagined economic geographies. The paper has demonstrated that the arrival of fibre-optic 
cables into East Africa generated much initial ‘buzz’ within, and about, the ICT industry, and 
allowed for a radical reimagining of the potentials for economic development. Expectations 
for radical change were seen in government policies and statements, media reports, and in the 
plans and aspirations of companies in the sector. In all of these cases there are hopes that 
changes in connectivity would ultimately lead to significant economic transformations. 
Despite the fact that this paper is based on non-representative samples, we can see 
that within Kenya’s BPO sector, there were a diverse range of creative and innovative 
practices (and possibilities) that have so far been given little space in office government 
visions, documents, plans, statements and policies in place immediately after the arrival of 
fibre-optic connectivity. Rather than highlight some of the unique work being carried out in 
Kenya, many of the official plans sought to emulate a model of low-end BPO work 
performed elsewhere in the world and compete largely on price. These plans were thus 
enacting Singh and Gurumurthy’s (2006) worries that the concept of an information society 
will simply encourage a shifting of low-end work to parts of the world with the lowest wages 
and weakest regulatory environments. More broadly, it is possible that such plans simply 
reflect older observations that technical advances have always benefitted cores over 
peripheries (e.g. Prebisch, 1972).  
Although these plans are progressing, and the number of call and contact centres in 
Kenya is increasing, we have seen that many people and firms in the sector began to forge 
significantly different paths. Nairobi is home to thousands of developers and designers that 
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are starting companies, building new products, and performing a diverse range of information 
processing services. Some of this work is carried out by start-ups attempting to build a 
reputation or brand, while other work is characterised by informal, freelance, unfixed 
practices using platforms like Guru.com and Elance.com. It is ultimately up to further 
research to get a better sense of how significant these practices are. Future work could ask 
questions like:  
 Are path-dependencies being laid (due to either rules or untraded interdependencies) 
that may hinder the development of high-tech start-ups? 
 How can Kenyan firms better take advantage of upgraded value chain positions? 
 Whose interests do these reconfigurations of the Kenyan economy serve? 
 How do these alternate practices tie into broader processes of economic development 
in Kenya? 
Irrespective of the actual effects of the cables within Kenya’s BPO sector, the 
discourse of connection was a powerful force driving much of the work performed in the 
sector. This is not to say the hyperbole about the arrival of the cables is not problematic. We 
have seen that these narratives can oversimplify economic relationships, communication and 
connectivity; that connectivity is presented as a binary in which distance becomes irrelevant 
and Kenya moves into some sort of imagined global village; that new connections are 
presented as a panacea for perceived deficiencies in development; and that many imagine that 
the arrival of fibre-optic connectivity will bring Kenya into an imagined ‘global village.’ The 
way in which we frame the intersections between economic development and ICTs matter, 
and sometimes can lead to unrealistic expectations, and a lack of focus on any potential 
harmful effects of the creative destruction that might be accelerated by Kenya’s changing 
communications ecosystem. However, within the contexts of the Kenyan BPO sector, it is 
also worth noting that these same unrealistic discourses being circulated and re-circulated are 
normative concepts that drove a distinct sense of optimism, hype and hope. Despite frequent 
power cuts, distance from markets, and various other competitive disadvantages that Kenyan 
firms face, the narrative about the arrival of the cables translated into an unbridled optimism 
that was seen in almost all of the interviews, media coverage and development plans related 
to the BPO sector. 
In other words, it is not just cost, speed, and the ability to access information and 
communicate that are having a transformative effect, but also a powerful unbridled optimism 
that drove, and allowed for a reimagining of policies, practices, and expectations. The case of 
the arrival of fibre-optic cables and Kenya’s BPO sector provide a fascinating case of how 
expectations about the development potentials of broadband internet matched up to 
observable effects. However, we now need further sustained research that asks who the 
winners and losers will be. If internet use, the capacity to access and use the requisite 
hardware and software, and even electricity supplies,12 remain highly concentrated in only 
certain parts of the country and amongst certain segments of the population,13 it is unlikely 
                                                           
12 Just under 29% of Kenyan households are connected to the electricity grid (KIPPRA 2010: 
21). 
13 For example, the vast majority of African Internet users are male (McCormick, 2002). 
Whilst Thioune (2003: 29) has found that a majority of women feel that these “instruments 
are not made for them.” 
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that the benefits of Kenya’s BPO sector will be broadly accrued. Within the sector, we also 
need to ask how this new reliance on flexible labour, highly volatile contracts and global 
body shopping will affect the Kenyan workforce: explore if the sector lives up to the 
expectations that have been placed on it; and how Kenyan firms can better position 
themselves in global value chains; and, ultimately interrogate what does the growth of 
Kenya’s BPO reveals about the potentials of this type of growth of this type of work 
elsewhere in the South.   
The case of the BPO sector in Kenya shows us that broadband internet is both the 
subject and the shaper of many promises and that it is often a prerequisite rather than a 
determinant of economic growth. As such, much more research and focus is needed on the 
ways in which the internet will influence Kenya’s human development goals and the role that 
the BPO sector will play in those plans. 
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